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eXeCutive summary

T

he remarkable growth of informal migrant entrepreneurship in South
Africa since 1990 would have been much lauded had it not been for
the striking detail that the actors in question are seen as “foreigners” or
“outsiders”. As such, they are uniformly viewed as undesirable and disadvantaging poor South African citizens. The growing presence of migrants in
the informal sector has created various tensions in South Africa, including
in government circles, ignoring the fact that in the free market economy of
South Africa, immigrants and refugees, like citizens and commercial enterprises, would otherwise enjoy the freedom to establish, operate and expand
their businesses.
The xenophobic anti-immigrant violence that swept South Africa in May
2008 led to the deaths of over 70 people, seriously injured 400 and displaced
as many as 100,000 from their communities. A large number of migrantowned businesses were also destroyed in the mayhem. Looting, burning and
destruction of business property was widespread and many migrant entrepreneurs were among those hounded out of their communities.
Such actions did not stop after May 2008, however. If anything, they
have become more insidious and pervasive.
South Africa provides an important case study of how citizen attitudes
and behaviours materially affect the business climate for migrant entrepreneurs. Trying to run a business in the informal economy is an especially
hazardous undertaking in South Africa. First, the state (both central and
municipal) has adopted a protectionist position, which leads to various
regulatory and policing responses that seek to disadvantage, if not eliminate,
migrant entrepreneurship. Second, the police run their own protection (or
non-harassment) rackets to benefit financially from those able to pay. Third,
South African competitors, particularly in the spaza sector, have increasingly adopted a strategy of using violence to intimidate and drive migrant
entrepreneurs out of an area. And fourth, a minority of citizens have turned
hostile attitudes towards migrants and refugees into violent actions by forcibly shutting down migrant-owned businesses and attacking their owners
and employees. Underlying all of these responses is a strong xenophobic
undertow.
National attitudinal surveys by SAMP, as well as in-depth qualitative
research and the personal testimony of many migrants, confirm that many
South Africans hold deep-rooted negative opinions about migrants and
migrant entrepreneurs. In the face of this body of evidence, claims by prominent political figures that xenophobia does not exist in South Africa ring
extremely hollow. South Africans make clear distinctions between African
migrants of different nationalities, with migrants from countries including
Somalia and Zimbabwe viewed far less favourably than those from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Since many informal migrant entrepreneurs
1
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are from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Somalia and the DRC, they are singled
out for harsh treatment.
SAMP asked South Africans how likely they would be to take part in collective action against the presence of migrants and found 25% were likely to
prevent a migrant from operating a business in their area. The survey results
revealed that around one in every ten South Africans was predisposed to
turn hostile attitudes into violent actions. This may seem a relatively low
proportion in light of the prevalence of negative attitudes but multiplied it
suggests that 3.8 million (out of an adult population of around 35 million)
South Africans would be prepared to use violent means to rid their neighbourhoods of foreign migrants.
Looting and vandalism of migrant-owned shops have been especially
common features of collective violence over the past several years. Some
of this violence is obviously motivated primarily by criminality, especially
robberies and looting, but to attribute all attacks to criminal motivation is
reductionist and misleading. In general, the weak structural and social position of “foreigners” in localized areas as “outsiders”, combined with limited
access to protection and justice, makes them more vulnerable to criminal
attack. Acts of collective violence include (a) written or verbal threats
and insults directed at migrant entrepreneurs; (b) public intimidation of
migrant entrepreneurs through protests or marches or other similar collective actions; (c) involuntary migrant shop closures; (d) direct physical violence against migrant store owners or their employees; (e) looting of store
contents; (f) damage to the physical structure of shops, especially through
arson; (g) damage or destruction of other property belonging to migrant
traders, including homes and cars; (h) temporary or permanent forced displacement of migrant entrepreneurs and their families; and (i) extortion for
protection by local leaders, police and residents. Looting of store goods and
damage to the stores were easily the most common types of action recorded.
While xenophobic views and actions are not espoused or approved of
by all local residents of affected settlements, their prevalence suggests that
they do enjoy sufficient support and that there are few deterrents. Far from
reducing xenophobia, claims that collective violence against migrant businesses are simply acts of criminality legitimize and may even incite further
violence. There is also the prejudiced, xenophobic idea that non-citizens
are not entitled to anything – not police protection and certainly not to
run a small business, even if it is enshrined in law and generated through
their own initiative. The bigger picture, which includes the threat to all
small-scale traders posed by supermarkets’ increasing dominance, is lost as
the focus turns to curtailing migrant entrepreneurship in place of the real,
urgent need to support opportunities for all small entrepreneurs in marginal
settlements through incentives and programmes.
This report focuses on the chronology and geography of collective violence against migrant entrepreneurs since South Africa’s first democratic
2
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elections in 1994. The overall aim of the research was to document and
create a chronological account of attacks on migrant businesses, to categorise the types and frequency of attacks and to map the locations where
such events occurred. The incidents discussed involve the intentional and
spontaneous participation of groups of people in acts of collective violence
against migrant businesses. Three distinct criteria, singly or in combination,
were used for including an incident as part of the analysis: first, the scale
of damage had to be extensive, affecting a number of businesses; second,
there had to have been displacement of and injuries to business owners;
and third, the violence had to have been perpetrated by groups rather than
individuals. The analysis revealed the following about attacks on migrant
entrepreneurs:
dents constitute less than 5% of recorded episodes. A definite upswing
is seen from 2006 onwards, with the sharpest growth occurring after
2008. Excluding events in May 2008, nearly 90% of recorded episodes of
group violence against migrant businesses occurred since the beginning
of 2008. The five years with the largest number of incidents were from
2010 to 2014.
fined to a few isolated locations. Since 2005, the majority of South
African provinces have been touched by such collective violence.
However, the Western Cape and Gauteng have experienced the highest
levels of violence. The overall number of affected provinces and localities has increased considerably since 2005 and the majority of provinces
have witnessed repeated incidents since 2009. Since 2009, at least 32
distinct locations have witnessed two or more episodes of group violence.
neighbouring settlements. Looting and vandalism of migrant-owned
shops have been especially common features of collective violence.
These actions, though criminal, may appear less grave when compared
to severe injuries and loss of lives, but they cannot be treated as inconsequential as they impose unwarranted hardships on migrant entrepreneurs through partial or complete loss of stock and destruction of their
shops and investments.
on South African citizens and businesses. Wholesalers, retailers and
suppliers are affected when migrant business activities are disrupted
or destroyed. Also, a significant proportion of migrant businesses rent
business spaces from South African property owners, who lose rental
income when their tenants are expelled or their premises are vandalized.
Other losers include poor local consumers who are forced to buy more
expensive goods from larger stores or face the inconvenience of travelling longer distances to purchase necessities.
3
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The opinions of politicians and officials about migrant entrepreneurs
often seem indistinguishable from the intolerant views of ordinary citizens
and this, in turn, reinforces negative beliefs and ideas in the populace at
large. Their excusing attacks on migrant entrepreneurs as unrelated to
xenophobia are contradicted by the details of many of these attacks. What
makes the official position especially ironic is when officials themselves
articulate sentiments that reproduce the xenophobic myths that they claim
do not exist. Failure to curb the situation by consistently restraining offenders and imposing stringent penalties on collective violence only expands the
elements of “opportunism” attached to such acts, encouraging others to participate, and reinforcing the unprotected position of migrants and refugees
as “outsiders” in affected areas.

4
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“Are we so despised that because I sell a loaf of bread a little cheaper
than my competitor I must be punished for it with my life?”.1

introduCtion

I

nternational migrants are often lauded for their enterprise, innovation
and business acumen.2 However, it is clear that these “unsung heroes” face
formidable obstacles in successfully establishing and growing an enterprise
in a new country of settlement.3 Common economic and social challenges
confronting small-scale immigrant entrepreneurs from the Global South
include limited market information, low levels of personal liquidity, poor
access to credit and startup capital, high transaction costs, gender discrimination, over-regulation and intense competition.4 The national and local
policy environment within which immigrant businesses operate also plays
a critical role in determining business failure or success. The environment
includes legal restrictions and obligations, attitudes and policies towards
migrant business activity, immigration and refugee legislation, and policing
practices. As one study of immigrant entrepreneurial behaviour notes, “the
effects of the regulatory environment are transmitted through a broad range
of state activities, including through the knock-on effect of immigration
laws, which may not have had an intended influence”.5
While some attention has been given to the economic and policy environment in explaining variations in business performance among immigrant
entrepreneurs, much less has been paid to how the negative reactions of
citizens to their activities and presence in the country might impact on
entrepreneurship.6 South Africa provides a particularly important case
study of how citizen attitudes and behaviours materially affect the business
climate for migrant entrepreneurs. In August 1997, for example, in the
midst of “rainbow nation” euphoria following the country’s first democratic
elections, non-South African street traders were attacked and assaulted on
the streets of Johannesburg. Many lost their merchandise and stands, some
at gunpoint. The violence and intimidation were “accompanied by angry
and vitriolic anti-immigrant rhetoric”.7 This incident, largely overlooked by
the state, emboldened a pattern of hostility towards migrant entrepreneurs
that has reached epidemic proportions over the last decade.
Sometimes lost in the sobering statistics about the anti-immigrant
violence that swept South Africa in May 2008 (over 70 people dead, 400
seriously injured, and 100,000 internally displaced) is the fact that many
migrant-owned businesses were caught up in the mayhem.8 Looting, burning and destruction of business property was widespread in the affected areas
and many migrant entrepreneurs were among those hounded out of their
communities. Such actions did not die out after May 2008. If anything, as
5
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this report demonstrates, they have become more insidious and pervasive,
and are certainly not confined to the areas that erupted in 2008.
The remarkable growth of informal migrant entrepreneurship in South
Africa since 1990, its innovative strategies, and the kinship, ethnic and
business networks through which goods are acquired and resources accumulated, would have been much lauded had it not been for the striking detail
that the actors in question are “foreigners” or “outsiders”. As such, they are
seen as undesirable and disadvantaging poor South African citizens with
meagre avenues for income generation and survival. The growing presence
of migrants in the informal sector has created noticeable tension in various
quarters in South Africa, including government circles, ignoring the fact
that in the free market economy of South Africa, immigrants and refugees,
like citizens and commercial enterprises, enjoy the freedom to establish,
operate and expand their businesses.9
Successive national attitudinal surveys by SAMP since 1996, as well as
in-depth qualitative research and the personal testimony of many migrants,
leave little doubt that South Africans hold deep-rooted negative opinions
about migrants and refugees in general and migrant entrepreneurs in particular.10 In the face of this body of evidence, recurrent denials by prominent
political figures that xenophobia exists ring especially hollow.11 Migrants
and refugees interfacing with state institutions in various sectors report
that these interactions are infused with attitudes and rhetoric that question
their right to be in the country and regularly lead to the denial of services
to which they are entitled by law and the constitution. Furthermore, when
the majority of South Africans in national opinion surveys believe that refugees and migrants should not be entitled to legal and police protection, it is
perhaps unsurprising that only the most egregious cases of police brutality
garner public sympathy and attention – and even then only because they
happen to be caught on video.
The first part of this report presents the results of SAMP’s most recent
survey of South African attitudes towards migrants and refugees on the linkages between negative attitudes and hostile behaviours. In other words, how
willing are South Africans to actually do something about the perceived
“threat” of migrants and what measures are they willing to take? This analysis provides the context for understanding the problems confronting migrant
entrepreneurs. The second section describes and analyses the nature of what
we call “extreme xenophobia”; that is, the prevalence of physical violence
against migrant entrepreneurs in South Africa.12 This report focuses on the
frequency and incidence of collective xenophobic violence, its impact on
migrant entrepreneurship and the evasions of the authorities.

6

Migration Policy SerieS no. 67

a danGerous Climate

B

eing perceived as a ‘foreigner’ in post-apartheid South Africa (particularly if one is from another African country) is inherently dangerous,
so pervasive is the feeling amongst ordinary South Africans that you do
not belong and should “go home”.13 Trying to run a business in the South
African informal economy is an especially hazardous undertaking as there
is a widespread perception that migrant entrepreneurial activities inevitably
disadvantage South Africans. This perception has been acted on in four
main ways. First, the state (both central and municipal) has adopted a “protectionist” position, which leads to various regulatory and policing responses
that seek to disadvantage, if not entirely eliminate, migrant entrepreneurship.14 Second, the police on the streets run their own protection (or nonharassment) rackets to benefit financially from those able to pay. Third,
South African competitors, particularly in the spaza sector, have increasingly adopted a strategy of what Charman and Piper call “violent entrepreneurship”; that is, the use of violence to intimidate and drive migrants
entrepreneurs out of an area.15 Fourth, a minority of citizens have turned
hostile attitudes into violent actions by forcibly shutting down migrantowned businesses and attacking their owners and employees. Underlying all
of these responses is a strong xenophobic undertow which is both manifest
and measurable.
The World Values Survey (an independent global attitudinal survey) has
consistently shown that South Africans are the least disposed globally to
migrants coming from other countries to engage in economic activity. The
most recent survey found that 30% of South Africans want a total prohibition on foreign migrants who intend to work in South Africa (easily the
highest figure of any country surveyed) (Table 1). Nearly half (48%) want
there to be strict limits on entry. Thus, 78% are basically opposed to the idea
of economic immigration to the country; no other country in the South has
more than 50%. South Africa (at 16%) also has the lowest proportion of
people in favour of skills-based immigration to fill gaps in the local job market and the lowest number (6%) who favour an open-door policy towards
economic migration.
SAMP’s periodic surveys of South African attitudes towards the impacts
of migration reveal more of the underlying economic hostility towards
migrants (Table 2). Although there have been changes over time (with
negative perceptions peaking in 2006), there has been a general growth
in negativity about the social and economic impacts of migration since
the 1990s. Between 1999 and 2010, for example, the proportion of South
Africans who agreed that migrants use up resources increased from 59% to
63%. Those agreeing that they were responsible for crime increased from
45% to 55% and those that they bring disease from 24% to 39%. In terms of
7
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economic impacts, those agreeing that they deprive South Africans of jobs
has remained steady at around 60%. The proportion who felt that migrants
bring skills needed by South Africa plummeted from 58% in 1999 to 34%
in 2010. Only a quarter agree that migrants actually create jobs for South
Africans.
Table 1: South African Attitudes To Economic Migrants in Comparative Perspective
Prohibit
immigration
(%)

Place strict limits
on entry
(%)

Let people in as
long as jobs are
available (%)

South Africa

30

48

16

6

India

23

23

25

30

Ghana

18

39

36

7

Zambia

11

30

44

15

Brazil

11

33

47

9

China

8

21

51

20

Indonesia

6

15

72

8

Thailand

5

16

65

14

Malaysia

2

8

72

18

Italy

8

49

37

6

United States

7

37

49

8

Germany

7

43

45

5

Australia

3

54

41

2

Canada

2

39

51

8

Country

Let in anyone who
wants to enter
(%)

South

North

Source: World Values Survey

Table 2: South African Perceptions of Impacts of Migration*
1999 (%)

2006 (%)

2010 (%)

Use up resources (e.g. water, electricity, housing)

59

67

63

Commit crime

45

67

55

Bring disease

24

49

39

Take jobs

56

62

60

Bring needed skills

58

25

34

Create jobs for South Africans

–

22

27

Social impacts

Economic impacts

*Percentage who agree/strongly agree

8
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Because migrants in South Africa come from all over the world it is
important to know if particular opprobrium is reserved for those from certain areas. In the latest SAMP survey, migrants from other Southern African
countries had the highest favourability ratings (25% “completely favourable”), followed by migrants from Europe and North America (21%) and
the rest of Africa (17%) (Table 3). Differences therefore exist but they are
not particularly large and all migrants, wherever they are from, rate much
lower than South Africans’ evaluations of themselves (65% favourable for
Black South Africans and 56% favourable for White South Africans). Since
a significant number of migrants (and migrant entrepreneurs) are refugees,
it is of interest that only 21% of South Africans have a completely favourable impression of refugees. Unsurprisingly, irregular migrants are viewed
with the most distaste (12% favourable and 49% completely unfavourable).
Table 3: South African Impressions of Migrants and Citizens, 2010
Completely
favourable (%)

Completely
unfavourable (%)

South African groups
Blacks

65

5

Whites

56

4

Coloureds

49

7

Indians/Asians

42

12

Southern Africans

25

21

Europeans/North Americans

21

18

Rest of Africa

17

26

Refugees/asylum-seekers

21

27

Irregular migrants

12

49

Migrant groups

South Africans do make clear distinctions between African migrants of
different nationalities (Table 4). Within the SADC region, migrants from
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are viewed more positively than those
from Zimbabwe and Mozambique. However, migrants from non-neighbouring countries rate even less positively: Nigerians (59% unfavourable), Congolese (51% unfavourable) and Somalis (50% unfavourable). Since many
informal migrant entrepreneurs are drawn from the ranks of Zimbabweans,
Mozambicans, Somalis and Congolese, it is not hard to imagine why they
are singled out for harsh treatment. SAMP also found that levels of xenophobia are highest amongst self-employed South Africans in the informal
economy.16 Levels are lower amongst both the unemployed and employees
in the informal economy.

9
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Table 4: South African Impressions of Migrants by Country of Origin, 2010
Unfavourable (%)

Favourable (%)

Zimbabwe

44

15

Mozambique

40

15

Botswana

24

31

Swaziland

23

33

Lesotho

23

32

Nigeria

59

7

Angola

48

9

DRC

51

9

Somalia

50

9

Ghana

45

11

Neighbouring countries

Other African countries

Simply because the majority of a national population hold negative
perceptions of a minority group such as migrants, it does not automatically
follow that violent acts against that group will be pervasive or, indeed, occur
at all. However, a significant minority of South Africans polled in attitudinal
surveys have consistently expressed a willingness to take the law into their
own hands. In 2010, for example, SAMP asked South Africans how likely
they would be to take part in collective action against migrants (Table 5). As
many as 23% said it was likely that they would act to stop migrants moving
into their community, 20% would prevent migrant children enrolling in the
same schools as their own children, and 15% would prevent migrants from
becoming co-workers. Important for the argument of this report, 25% said
they would be likely to stop a migrant from operating a business in their area.
By dividing respondents into those that lived in ‘hotspots’ in the May
2008 violence and those in areas that were not, it is possible to ascertain if
areas with experience of widespread violence are more prone to future violence.17 While hotspot residents are more likely to prevent migrants from
operating a business and moving into their community, they are less likely
to oppose them becoming co-workers or enrolling their children in the same
schools. However, the differences are not large and one in four residents of
areas not directly affected by May 2008 said they were likely to take action
to stop a migrant from operating a business in their community.
Table 5: Likelihood of South Africans Taking Preventative Action Against Migrants, 2010
How likely are you to take action to prevent
migrants doing the following: (% Likely/Very likely)

All urban
areas

2008
hotspots

2008
other

From operating a business in your area

25

27

24

From moving into your neighbourhood

23

27

21

From enrolling their children in school

20

18

21

From becoming a co-worker

15

14

21

10
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Finally, the SAMP survey asked South Africans how likely they would be
to take certain actions against people they suspected were irregular migrants
in their community. Since South Africans believe that the vast majority
of foreign migrants are in the country illegally, this is not very different to
asking what they would do about migrants in general. Around a third said
they would report them to the police, to employers or to community leaders (Table 6). Fewer (15%) said they would combine with others to eject
them from the community and 11% said they were prepared to use violence
against the migrants. The predilection to use violence was actually slightly
stronger in areas not affected by the attacks of May 2008. What this means
is that around one in every ten South Africans is predisposed to turn hostile
attitudes into violent actions. This may seem a relatively low proportion in
light of the prevalence of negative attitudes but multiplied it does suggest
that 3.8 million (out of an adult population of around 35 million) South
Africans would be prepared to use violent means to rid their neighbourhoods of foreign migrants.
Table 6: Likelihood of Taking Punitive Action Against Irregular Migrants, 2010
How likely are you to take action against irregular
migrants in your area: (% Likely/Very likely)

All urban
areas

2008 hotspots

2008 other

Report them to police

36

34

36

Report them to employer

27

26

28

Report them to community association

27

24

29

Combine to force them to leave

15

15

15

Use violence against them

11

9

11

methodoloGy

T

here has been no systematic longitudinal analysis of the nature, distribution and intensity of violent incidents targeting migrants and refugees. Official statistics are not maintained and the tendency of government
representatives and senior politicians to classify violent attacks on migrants
and migrant businesses as “opportunistic crime” has only deepened the
uncertainty about the occurrence of xenophobic violence in the country
and its underlying causes.18 This report draws on the evidence from an
extensive archive of news articles from various media sources collected
by SAMP since 1994 and detailed timeline reconstructions already in the
public domain.19 The overall aim of the research was to create a chronological account of attacks on migrant businesses, to categorise the types and
frequency of attacks and to map the locations where such events occurred.
Several qualifications are in order. First, research on hate crimes in other
contexts confirms that a sizeable proportion of such episodes go unreported
and unrecorded.20 The inventory on which this paper is based does not
11
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claim to be exhaustive since many incidents undoubtedly go unreported
by the press or human rights groups. Second, the lack of confidence in law
enforcement agencies, poor prosecution of offenders, weak deterrent measures for xenophobic violence, as well as the continued presence of offenders
in localized settings, are all likely to discourage migrants from reporting to
the authorities.21 Third, the information in the database tends to be descriptive in nature, describing but not explaining why attacks take place or why
they take the particular form that they do.
Although there is plenty of evidence of violent attacks on individual
migrant entrepreneurs, this paper focuses on acts of collective or group
violence. Collective violence has been defined as the “instrumental use of
violence by persons who define themselves as members of a group against
another group in order to achieve political, social or economic objectives”.22
Aggressive social interaction organized on a group basis is the key feature
here, whether this group or collective identity is assumed and transitory or
has a permanent and stable character. This form of episodic social interaction involves perpetrators who distinguish themselves from the targeted
victims either subliminally or directly. Moreover, this contact directly inflicts
physical damage on the targeted persons and/or their possessions with some
level of coordination and synchronization amongst the perpetrators, even in
incidents that appear spontaneous with low levels of organization.23 There
are obviously different varieties of collective violence, varying in scope,
duration and degree of organization. The damage caused by such violence
also varies in scale and gravity with some acts having far-reaching and
deadly consequences, such as those that swept South Africa in May 2008.24
Collective violence has also been defined as a type of social control in
which grievances and perceived wrongs are handled through unilateral
aggression.25 The collectivization of violence generally occurs where there
is strong partisanship and additional individuals support one side against the
other. Solidarity is skewed in favour of the perpetrators and distanced from
the targets of violence.26 A high frequency of collective violence is an indicator of profound social and cultural distance between the groups involved
(the perpetrators and their intended targets). Other localized factors such
as low institutional confidence, weak policing, and areas with long histories
of violent crime, buttress a social environment where the likelihood and
opportunities for collective violence remain robust.27 Institutional barriers to protection and justice for the victims activate and perpetuate the
violence.
The incidents discussed in this paper involve the intentional and spontaneous participation of groups of people in acts of collective violence against
migrant businesses. The SAMP database contains information on over 250
separate incidents of collective violence since 1994. Migrant entrepreneurs
and their businesses were also severely affected during the large-scale violence that occurred in May 2008. However, the events of that month are
12
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excluded from this assessment since they have been examined in depth
elsewhere and are often treated as an exceptionally large singular event,
even though there were at least 100 (and perhaps as many as 150) localized
incidents of collective violence.28 The assessment is based on the identification and analysis of the largest or most significant episodes occurring since
1994. Three distinct criteria, singly or in combination, were used for inclusion: first, the scale of damage had to be extensive, affecting a number of
businesses; second, there had to have been displacement of and injuries to
business owners; and third, the violence had to have been perpetrated by
groups rather than individuals.

ColleCtive violenCe aGainst miGrant entrePreneurs
ChronoloGy of ColleCtive violenCe

F

rom 1994 to August 2014 (excluding May 2008), there were at least
250 documented episodes of group-based violence against migrants and
refugee businesses in various locations around the country. The actual tally
is likely to be even higher since not all events reach the attention of the
media and monitoring organizations. An analysis of the frequency of collective violence reveals a marked pattern of escalation over time (Table 7).

Table 7: Frequency of Collective Violence
Year

No. of incidents

Percentage

Pre-2005

9

4

2005

4

2

2006

9

4

2007

9

4

2008*

19

8

2009

17

7

2010

46

20

2011

22

10

2012

25

11

2013

36

16

2014 (to end-August)

32

14

228

100

Total
* Excluding May 2008 attacks

Pre-2005 incidents constitute less than 5% of recorded episodes. A definite upswing is seen from 2006 onwards, with the sharpest growth occurring
after 2008. Excluding events in May 2008, nearly 90% of recorded episodes
of group violence against migrant businesses occurred since the beginning
13
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of 2008. The five years with the largest number of incidents were from
2010 to 2014. The highest annual number (20% of the total) was recorded
in 2010 during an upsurge in xenophobic attacks after the World Cup was
held in South Africa. While these episodes differed in terms of the number
of affected migrants and the severity of the damage, it is evident that smallscale, informal migrant businesses occupy a highly precarious position in
South African settlements, having become especially vulnerable to situations of collective violence.

GeoGraPhies of ColleCtive violenCe
Collective violence targeting migrant entrepreneurs is no longer confined to
a few isolated locations. Since 2005, the majority of South African provinces
have been touched by collective violence against migrant businesses. However, the Western Cape and Gauteng have experienced the highest levels
of violence. The overall number of affected provinces and localities has
increased considerably since 2005; indeed, the majority of provinces have
witnessed repeated incidents since 2009. In 2005-2006, incidents occurred
in six distinct locations within three provinces (Figure 1). In 2009-2010,
they occurred in at least 14 separate locations extending over six of the nine
provinces in South Africa (Figures 2 to 4). The year 2010 stands out with at
least 37 separate locations situated in six provinces. The number of affected
areas may have fallen somewhat to 22 in 2012 and 27 in 2013, but the number of affected provinces still stood at 6 and 7 respectively (Figures 5 to 7).
Several of the affected locations have witnessed repeated rounds of collective violence. Diepsloot, for example, was affected in 2006, and again
in 2009, 2010 and 2013.29 Other areas have experienced several incidents
with short intervals between them. In the town of Delmas in Mpumalanga,
for example, migrant businesses were assailed in February 2013 and again
in April that year. In Mamelodi, migrant businesses were attacked in June
2014 and again in September. Since 2009, at least 32 distinct locations have
witnessed two or more episodes of group violence (Table 8). Of these, collective violence has been repeated on three or more occasions in 12 areas:
Delmas, Diepsloot, Duduza, Gugulethu, Khayelitsha, KwaNobuhle, Langa,
Mamelodi, Motherwell, Orange Farm, Ramaphosa and Soweto. Some of
these locations, such as Ramaphosa township, also witnessed extensive violence and destruction during May 2008.30
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Table 8: Collective Violence Locations, 2009–2014
Locations

Province

Booysens Park, KwaDesi, KwaNobuhle, Kugya, Motherwell, Port Elizabeth

Eastern Cape

Bothaville, Botshabelo, Deneysville, Fouriesburg, Koppies, Kroonstad, Maokeng,
Odendaalsrus, Sasolburg, Thabong, Viljoenskroon, Welkom, Zamdela

Free State

Atteridgeville, Benoni, Boipatong, Diepsloot, Duduza, Ekurhuleni, Evaton, Fochville, Freedom Park, Ga-Rankuwa, Imbeliseni, Johannesburg, Kya Sands, Lakeside, Mamelodi, Mayfair, Orange Farm, Protea, Ramaphosa, Ratanda, Sebokeng, Sharpeville, Soshanguve, Soweto, Tembisa, Thokoza, Tsakane

Gauteng

Giyani, Marapong, Phagemeng, Lebowakgomo, Lephalale

Limpopo

Botshabelo, Delmas, Emjindini, Leandra, Mhluzi, Sakhile, Siyathemba

Mpumalanga

Barkly West

Northern Cape

Boitekong, Boitumelong, Rustenburg, Setlagole

North West

Bishop Lavis, Bloekombos, Botrivier, Cape Town, Delft, Du Noon, Franschhoek,
Freedom Park, Grabouw, Gugulethu, Harare, Khayelitsha, Klapmuts, Langa,
Malmesbury, Mbekweni, Mitchells Plain, Moorreesburg, Nyanga, Paarl East,
Philippi, Riviersonderend, Samora Machel, Silverton, Valhalla Park, Wellington,
Wolseley, Worcester

Western Cape

Figure 1: Collective Violence Locations, South Africa 2005–2006
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Figure 2: Collective Violence Locations, South Africa 2009–2010
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Figure 3: Collective Violence Locations, Gauteng 2009–2010
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Figure 4: Collective Violence Locations, Western Cape 2009–2010
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Figure 5: Collective Violence Locations, South Africa 2012–2013
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LIMPOPO

Figure 6: Collective Violence Locations, Gauteng 2012–2013
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tyPoloGies of ColleCtive violenCe
The nationwide attacks on migrants and refugees in May 2008 represent
the nadir of xenophobic hostility in South Africa. There is an obvious
temptation to characterize other, prior and subsequent, episodes of collective violence as “minor” incidents. Such a conclusion would be profoundly
misplaced. The cumulative impact of months, indeed years, of low-level
verbal and physical warfare against migrant entrepreneurs has taken a major
toll on the lives and livelihoods of some of South Africa’s most enterprising residents. Belligerent, discriminatory and abusive types of action have
occurred. They include (a) written or verbal threats and insults directed
at migrant entrepreneurs; (b) public intimidation of migrant entrepreneurs
through protests or marches or other similar collective actions; (c) involuntary migrant shop closures; (d) direct physical violence against migrant
store owners or their employees; (e) looting of store contents; (f) damage
to the physical structure of shops, especially through arson; (g) damage or
destruction of other property belonging to migrant traders, including homes
and cars; (h) temporary or permanent forced displacement of migrant entrepreneurs and their families; and (i) extortion for protection by local leaders,
police and residents. Looting of store goods and damage to stores were easily
the most common types of action recorded.
A number of incidents are worth recalling to illustrate the nature and
intensity of collective violence after 2008. Between mid-2009 and late 2010,
for example, more than 20 migrants were killed and another 40 received
serious injuries in various attacks.31 Of these, at least four people were
killed during a series of violent confrontations over the presence of migrant
traders in the Freedom Park township of Gauteng.32 In mid-2011, 52 shops
were plundered and three burnt down in Motherwell and three shops looted
and one burnt down in KwaDesi.33 In 2012, more than 700 shops were
looted and/or destroyed and over 500 migrants were displaced because of
public violence in Botshabelo in the Free State province.34 That same year,
two Bangladeshi traders (described as Pakistani citizens in some accounts)
suffered third-degree burns and later died after a group of assailants threw
a petrol-bomb on their container store in Thokoza and blocked the store’s
entrance preventing their escape.35 Three shops were then petrol-bombed
during large-scale looting of Somali-owned businesses in the Valhalla Park
area of Cape Town.36
During a particularly volatile period in Port Elizabeth in mid-2013, there
was extensive vandalism, arson and plundering of an estimated 150 spaza
shops operated by migrants and refugees.37 One Somali refugee, Abdi Nasir
Mahmoud Good, was publicly stoned to death while attempting to salvage
his belongings from his ransacked store. Video footage was later released
on YouTube showing the perpetrators, some of whom were children in
school uniforms. Also in 2013, more than 200 migrant shopkeepers oper20

Migration Policy SerieS no. 67

ating small-scale businesses in the town of Delmas, east of Johannesburg,
were forced to close their stores after a spate of attacks. Four spaza shops
were bombed in Mitchells Plain after their migrant owners refused to pay
protection money.38 In a bout of violence over six days in June 2014, two
refugees were killed when nearly 100 migrant businesses were looted or
torched in Mamelodi East outside Pretoria.39 The violence was repeated in
the Phomolong area of Pretoria two months later when three people were
killed and several others wounded during a rampage that lasted for three
weeks.40 Finally, before the army was called in to contain the unrest, a
Somali trader was killed and three stores were torched when migrant traders
were attacked during post-election violence in Alexandra township in mid2014.41 As these examples of collective violence demonstrate, the scale of
the attacks is sometimes sizeable and can spill over into neighbouring settlements. Looting and vandalism of migrant-owned shops have been especially
common features of collective violence over the past several years. These
actions, though criminal, may appear less grave when compared to severe
injuries and loss of lives, but they cannot be treated as inconsequential as
they impose unwarranted hardships on migrant entrepreneurs through partial or complete loss of stock and destruction of their shops and investments.
The vulnerability of migrant shopkeepers has exposed them to other
invidious forms of exploitation. Some 80 migrant traders operating from
Extensions 8 to 12 in Diepsloot settlement north of Johannesburg, for example, were coerced into providing payment as “protection money” to local
residents to avoid damages to and pillaging of their stores during service
delivery protests.42 A Johannesburg High Court order, in response to an
urgent petition on xenophobic violence in Duduza and surrounding townships of the Ekurhuleni municipality, acknowledged the culpability of a ward
councillor in instigating acts of violence against Somali, Bangladeshi and
Ethiopian migrant traders.43 Migrants claimed that he stoked xenophobia
and then solicited bribes in exchange for their safety.
Collective violence against migrant businesses not only shatters livelihoods of the targeted migrant groups, it impacts on South African citizens
and businesses. Wholesalers, retailers and suppliers are inevitably affected
when migrant business activities are disrupted or destroyed. Also, a significant proportion of migrant businesses rent business spaces from South
African property owners, who lose rental income when their tenants are
expelled or their premises are vandalized.44 In addition, extensive damage
to store structures degrades the existing and often meagre assets of local
property owners. Other losers include poor local consumers who are forced
to buy more expensive goods from larger stores or face the inconvenience of
travelling longer distances to purchase necessities.
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PreCiPitants of violenCe
It is not easy to tease out and identify intentions, motivations and underlying causes in turbulent situations, especially when relying on reportage
and monitoring. Scholars researching collective violence have commonly
expressed this dilemma.45 Some things are, however, evident. Some of the
violence perpetrated against migrant businesses is obviously motivated only
or primarily by criminal behaviour, especially robberies and looting, but
to attribute all attacks to criminal motivation (as the state seeks to do) is
completely reductionist and misleading. In general, the weak structural and
social position of “foreigners” in localized areas as “outsiders”, combined
with limited access to protection and justice, certainly makes them more
vulnerable to criminal attack. In other words, the attackers may not themselves be always motivated by xenophobia but it is xenophobia that makes
their targets easy prey.
While the precipitants (or triggers) for any particular incident of collective violence vary, there is a clear general pattern both in terms of the
choice of targets and the selective directing of violence toward migrants
and migrant businesses. Local business competitors have certainly animated
some of the collective violence against migrant entrepreneurs.46 A distinctive feature is the recent emergence and incendiary stance of loosely-formed
groups, purportedly representing many or all South African small-business
owners. These groups range from localized structures like the Zanokhanyo
Retailers’ Association operating in townships, settlements and urban areas
such as Khayelitsha, to larger regional forums like the innocuously-named
Greater Gauteng Business Forum. Since 2008, these groups have engaged in
numerous public hate campaigns against migrant businesses, liberally using
belligerent tactics ranging from forced store closures, coerced price increases, limits on the number of migrant businesses in an area, and public threats
through letters or by radio. A few months after the May 2008 violence, for
example, many Somali shopkeepers in Khayelitsha received threatening
hand-delivered letters from the Zanokhanyo Retailers’ Association ordering
them to cease operating their stores.47 In late 2010, the association again
used intimidatory tactics to shut down Somali-owned shops in Khayelitsha,
claiming that the terms of an agreement reached with Somali shopkeepers
limiting the number of migrant businesses in the area were being violated.48
The Middelburg Small Business Community Forum claimed credit for mobilizing local authorities after the Steve Tshwete Municipality shut down 50
Somali shops and refused to issue them with trading licences.49 Accusing
them of unfair competition and rising crime, the local forum stoked group
violence against migrant-run shops in Lephalale in Limpopo in 2013 in the
course of which five shops, two houses and three vehicles were razed.50
By early 2011, the Greater Gauteng Business Forum had become a very
visible presence through its intimidation of migrant traders in the prov22
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ince of Gauteng. There are reports of the forum’s direct involvement in
campaigns to expel migrant businesses from locations such as Kathlehong,
Soweto, Eldorado Park, Ramaphosa, Mamelodi and Diepsloot. The forum
chairperson claimed that campaigns against “foreign traders” were “strictly
business” and have “nothing to do with xenophobia or politics”, but the
overt reasoning to justify these group actions draws from a familiar reservoir
of xenophobic beliefs and a wilful misunderstanding of the rights of migrants
and refugees in South Africa.51 Distorted ideas about migrants’ presence
and their impacts on South Africa are used to justify collective mobilization
and violence against migrant businesses. For example, the Greater Gauteng
Business Forum is reported to have stated that “these people are molesting our economy”.52 Forum members and other local business groups have
expressed similar discriminatory sentiments: “We feel that foreigners who
entered the country illegally or don’t have a business licence to run spaza
shops should leave because they are destroying our small local businesses
and exploiting our people”.53 In 2013, the forum reiterated its central argument by maintaining that all migrant entrepreneurs must “go back home”
because they are “here to destroy local business and people” asserting, as
well, that “if nothing is done about it, there will be war”.54
The forceful targeting of migrant businesses, particularly spaza shops,
has been a common feature of anti-government service-delivery protests in
various parts of the country. In 2014, for example, one-third of the violent
incidents involving looting and vandalism of migrant-owned shops took
place during local anti-government or anti-municipality protests. Dissatisfaction over the pace of road construction and employment of locals for
infrastructure projects in Sebokeng, for example, led to efforts to forcibly
oust migrant businesses.55 Agitating for a better water supply, Hebron
residents in North West province looted at least six shops in February 2014
after police cracked down on protesters. The connections between local
dissatisfaction and resentment over service issues and attacks on migrantowned shops need greater explanation. One hypothesis advanced by Abdul
Hasan of the Somali Association of South Africa is that “they are targeting
foreigners because we are the weaker link in the community, so they hit us
to get government attention”.56
On several occasions, other kinds of protests have spiralled into xenophobic attacks on migrant businesses.57 More than 100 shops of Pakistani
and Bangladeshi migrants were attacked over several days in early 2012
in Welkom, Odendaalsrus and Thabong, for example, when local youths
went on a rampage after discussions over enhanced quotas for hiring South
Africans on local mines stalled.58 In 2013, an estimated 200 businesses were
damaged and plundered in Zamdela and neighbouring Deneysville and
Koppies in Sasolburg during violent agitation rejecting the amalgamation of
municipalities.59 Allegations of dumped ballot boxes, election rigging and
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discontent over the outcome-generated post-election unrest in Alexandra in 2014 took a swift xenophobic turn when migrant shopkeepers were
viciously targeted.60 Also in 2014, an unresolved labour dispute between the
South African Municipal Workers’ Union and the Metsimaholo Municipality of Free State prompted the violent public raiding of migrant businesses
in Zamdela and neighbouring settlements of France and Armelia outside
Sasolburg.61
Participants in collective violence may not always use xenophobic
language while attacking migrant stores, but an underlying xenophobic
rationale is often there. Migrant entrepreneurs invariably characterize the
general attitudes of the local community towards them in this way. Seven
shops owned by Pakistani migrants were wrecked and ransacked in Boipatong during the course of an anti-government protest in February 2010,
for example. The migrants themselves described the attacks as “hateful”
and some participants defended their actions by arguing that “foreigners
don’t support our protests, and they are living a better life than us here in
our country”.62 Zamdela township’s residents said that migrant businesses
were targeted in early 2013 during a violent protest against the merger of
Metsimaholo municipality in Sasolburg with the Ngwathe municipality near
Parys because they did not “assist” the local community.63 In Duduza, local
residents justified their collective, aggressive attacks on 200 migrant-owned
shops in late 2013 as follows: “They come here and steal our jobs and now
they are killing our children. We cannot accept this.”64
In other instances, there were direct triggers linked to the presence of
migrants. A Somali shopkeeper was killed and all Somali traders had to
evacuate Booysen Park in 2013 when local residents associated them with
criminal gangs and attacked them.65 Amandla Wethu Workers’ Union
members assailed many Bangladeshi, Chinese, and Pakistani-owned businesses in Mthatha in the Eastern Cape after their president claimed that
South African employees were being poorly remunerated.66 Some of the
largest episodes of group violence have involved retaliatory vigilantism
in response to the acts of one or two migrants. Instead of confining their
response to the perpetrators, the vigilantes strike out at many or all persons
of the same nationality or ethnicity as the migrant offenders, or even at all
“foreigners” in the area. After a migrant shop owner in Cullinan, east of
Pretoria, allegedly assaulted a child for stealing from his store, for example,
local residents looted many shops owned by migrants and refugees and burnt
three of their vehicles.67 Some 400 residents of Riviersonderend struck out
at all Somali-owned shops in the area after a South African resident last
seen in the company of Somalis was found dead. After a migrant shopkeeper
reportedly shot a local youth for stealing from his store in Jeffreys Bay in
early 2008, all Somali traders were attacked and forcibly ousted from the
town.68 In 2013, in Duduza on the East Rand, after an altercation over a
24
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cellphone airtime voucher between a Somali shop owner and a local youth,
who was shot, some 200 stores belonging to Somali, Ethiopian, Eritrean
and Bangladeshi migrants were stripped of their contents and several structures were incinerated.69 In Lebokwagamo near Polokwane in April 2011,
residents attacked all migrants from Ethiopia living in the area, looting and
damaging their homes and businesses after one of their compatriots was
accused of raping a girl.70
While xenophobic views and actions are not espoused or approved of
by all local residents of affected settlements, their prevalence suggests that
they do enjoy sufficient support and that there are few deterrents. Support
from local community leaders also conveys a sense of legitimation and impunity, reducing the inhibition of potential offenders and, at the same time,
enhancing the “opportunistic” aspects of the violence. Even official tolerance and passivity convey ambiguous messages that are only likely to perpetuate and shore up repeated cycles of violence. In several cases, affected
traders hit by such attacks have shifted to another settlement only to end up
facing attacks there too. In a general sense, this rhythmic configuration of
collective, public violence is only likely to preserve and reinforce the social
distance between South Africans and “foreigners”. Mutual distrust and suspicion between groups is an inevitable outcome of a polarized context where
xenophobic sentiments and practices are commonplace. Negative attitudes
about South Africans expressed by migrants and refugees are merely another
expression of the high degree of detachment between groups in these communities.

offiCial evasions

I

n a stance that has now become almost customary, South African politicians and senior officials at national, provincial and municipal levels are
quick to label collective violence against migrants and refugees as “opportunistic crimes”, committed by “criminal elements” or “hardened criminals”,
while simultaneously repudiating the role of anti-foreigner prejudice.71 At
national level, individual Ministers and the Cabinet as a whole have repeatedly warned against viewing attacks on migrants and refugees as evidence
of xenophobia. President Zuma recently informed South African MPs that
xenophobia was not “such a huge problem in South Africa”.72 Justice Minister Jeff Radebe made a similar observation in Parliament when some 80
stores and businesses owned by migrants were looted in Diepsloot: “The
criminal activities that are perpetuated by some South Africans are not
a reflection of xenophobic attacks against foreigners.”73 A South African
Police Services (SAPS) spokesperson insisted that “when we see children
looting shops and people robbing people of their goods, it is to us a blatant
sign of crime that is being excused as xenophobia”.74
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The South African government recently took the unusual step of challenging Al Jazeera’s online coverage of the stoning to death of a Somali
refugee and other violence against migrants and refugees in Port Elizabeth.75 Government spokesperson Phumla Williams insisted that the article
“painted an incorrect picture of…South Africa” and was “far from reality”
and continued that “South Africa allows and welcomes foreign nationals”
and has “strived to build a society based on the values of unity and togetherness”.76 With this came the standard denial of the presence of xenophobia
in South Africa: “The looting, displacement and killing of foreign nationals
in South Africa should not be viewed as xenophobic attacks, but opportunistic
criminal acts [emphasis ours] that have the potential to undermine the unity
and cohesiveness of our communities.”77
Similarly, at provincial level, the Gauteng government was quick to
condemn the “brutal and senseless attack” on two Bangladeshi traders in
Thokoza in 2012 and urged South Africans “to refrain from branding this
attack as having been motivated by xenophobia [emphasis ours]”.78 After more
than 100 complaints of looting and vandalism of migrant shops were registered in 2013 in various parts of Gauteng, government spokesperson Williams underscored the government’s concern over the “so-called xenophobic
attacks on foreign nationals [emphasis ours]”.79 When large-scale looting
and attacks on migrant-owned shops occurred in 2013 in Port Elizabeth,
provincial police characterized “the motive for the attacks on foreignowned spaza shops” as “not xenophobic in nature, but a criminal element that
has seized an opportunity [emphasis ours]”.80 This by-now-familiar argument
was wheeled out again in early 2014 when violence occurred in Mamelodi
East and police personnel attributed it to “criminal elements”, denying that
xenophobia was a factor.
The attribution of collective violence against migrant entrepreneurs to
criminals and not in any way as evidence of xenophobia rings extremely hollow when the details of many of these attacks are examined. What makes
the official position especially ironic is when officials themselves articulate
sentiments that reproduce the xenophobic myths that they claim do not
exist. A senior official in the Department of Home Affairs, for example, is
reported to have informed South African MPs that “if you go to Alexandra,
you go to Sunnyside, you go everywhere, spaza shops, hair salons, everything
has been taken over by foreign nationals…they displace South Africans
by making them not competitive”.81 At an official meeting, then National
Police Commissioner Bheki Cele characterized immigrants and refugees as
“people who jump borders”, were flooding into the country and destroying
the livelihoods of South African informal traders: “The spazas…are better
stocked than Shoprite. Our people have been economically displaced. All
these spaza shops [in the townships] are not run by locals…One day our
people will revolt, and we’ve appealed to the Department of Trade and
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Industry to do something about it.”82 Former Deputy DTI Minister Elizabeth Thabethe made similarly provocative statements about the supposed
negative effects of Somali entrepreneurs in late 2013 at a national conference on small, medium and micro enterprises: “You still find many spazas
with African names, but when you go in to buy, you find your Mohammeds
and most of them are not even registered”.83
More recently, ANC Secretary-General Gwede Mantashe declared that
the South African government was concerned about South African small
businesses that were closing, having been “swallowed by foreign migrants”
who “did not pay tax and comply with certain laws”.84 He informed an election campaign rally at Eldorado Park South in Johannesburg that, “if you go
to Soweto, corner shops have been taken over by foreigners. We must do
something about it”. Responding to a wave of public criticism of his Licensing of Businesses Bill, DTI Minister Rob Davies, defended the Bill as an
effort to curb illegal imports:
All kinds of outlets [are] springing up that may well be involved
in illegal imports and things of that sort…If you are found guilty
of a number of offences, such as selling counterfeit goods...[and]
you’ve been involved in illegal imports, found guilty of contravening the Foodstuffs, Cosmetics, and Disinfectants Act, been selling sub-standard products, employing illegal foreigners, or found
guilty of conducting illegal business from the licensed premises,
you’ve been doing drug trade or illegal liquor selling or anything of
the sort...your licence is automatically revoked. So we say, easy in,
easy out. You do any of those things, we don’t want you.85
The Minister did not mention that existing legislation is more than able
to deal with illegal imports, the employment of irregular migrants and illicit
drug and liquor selling. He did not respond to criticisms that he viewed the
informal economy as a hive of criminality and that the Bill was actually a
frontal attack on informal business and migrant entrepreneurship.
The opinions of politicians and officials about migrant entrepreneurs
often seem indistinguishable from the intolerant views of ordinary citizens
and this, in turn, reinforces negative beliefs and ideas in the populace at
large. Failure to curb the situation by consistently restraining offenders and
imposing stringent penalties on collective violence only expands the elements of “opportunism” attached to such acts, encouraging others to participate, and reinforcing the unprotected position of migrants and refugees
as “outsiders” in affected areas. Thus, photographs in the South African
media in July 2012 show the Bishop Lavis (Cape Town) police “standing
and doing nothing” while spaza shops were torched and looted in Valhalla
Park.86 The Western Cape Minister for Community Safety, Dan Plato, later
announced in a public statement that the Independent Police Investigative
Directorate would examine the case and “take necessary action where any
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negligence or wrongdoing is identified”.87 However, it is not clear if the case
was actually investigated or disciplinary proceedings carried out against the
SAPS personnel.88
Police passivity has been reported by migrants and the media in many
episodes of violence targeting foreign-owned businesses. As far back as
2005, for example, some 150 Pakistani entrepreneurs operating spaza shops
in Pietermaritzburg organized a protest march against the local police
demanding accountability after a large mob looted goods worth R150,000
from one of them.89 Refugee shopkeepers from the Democratic Republic
of Congo, Ethiopia and Somalia who were forced out of Zwelethemba
township near Worcester in the Western Cape in 2008 filed claims in the
Equality Court in 2009 seeking redress for the unfair discrimination, xenophobia and inadequate protection provided by police officials during this
violent episode.90 Despite extensive looting and vandalism of Somali shops
in Motherwell, Port Elizabeth, in 2013, local police said they were unable
to offer protection.91 Immigrants whose shops and homes were assailed in
Wallacedene during a housing dispute in mid-2013 maintained that police
personnel refused to provide assistance, insisting instead that they leave
South Africa.92 Weak, hostile or indifferent police responses provide strong
incentives for repetition by reinforcing biases among existing offenders and
signalling to potential offenders that migrant businesses are easy targets.
The victimization of migrant businesses through extortion for protection
has also been reported. A report on policing in Khayelitsha, an area prone
to regular violence against migrants and refugees, observed that local police
personnel often demanded bribes from migrant traders and stole items from
their stores.93 Civil society groups accused the local police of checking
immigration documents of affected traders instead of shielding them during the public violence that erupted in Mamelodi East and West in June
2014.94 Dissatisfied with the quality and consistency of police protection,
spaza owners have adopted two main strategies. First, to protect their own
businesses from attack, they have entered into local agreements with the
police and South African entrepreneurs that they will support their efforts
to prevent any new migrant businesses opening in an area. Second, they
have begun to arm themselves with weapons to defend their stores and
their lives. Armed clashes between attackers and store owners have become
increasingly common in recent years.
While the police are often accused of standing by in situations of collective violence, they also act against migrant businesses when ordered to do
so. With the tacit consent of provincial authorities, and without any prior
warning, local police in Limpopo province undertook an anti-crime campaign called “Operation Hardstick” in 2012, ostensibly to apprehend criminals and aggressively tackle illicit activities. They sealed some 600 businesses run by immigrants and refugees, confiscated their trading stock, imposed
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fines on them for trading without permits and, according to some accounts,
detained traders as well as subjecting them to verbal xenophobic abuse.95
Thirty displaced Ethiopians were then forced to flee when the house they
were staying in was fire-bombed. The exercise was selectively enforced on
migrant entrepreneurs and did not affect South African businesses in these
locations. The Supreme Court, in finding against the Limpopo Government
and for the Somali Association of South Africa, observed that “one is left
with the uneasy feeling that the stance adopted by the authorities in relation
to the licensing of spaza shops and tuck-shops was in order to induce foreign
nationals who were destitute to leave our shores”.96
Weak or lack of effective punishment for the perpetrators of violence
sends permissive signals and tacit sanction. People have been arrested in
various parts of South Africa over the past few years for public violence,
looting, arson, malicious damage to property, possession of stolen goods and
for their participation in collective violence targeting migrant businesses.
But a great many have been released after verbal warnings and very few
offenders have been indicted or faced harsh prison sentences. For example,
in 2011, the Germiston Magistrate’s Court released without any penalty 71
Kathlehong residents arrested for distributing intimidating letters threatening “drastic action” against migrant-owned businesses.97 Again, 11 people
were arrested for the death of Somali refugee Nasir Good, but none of the
offenders was formally charged or faced criminal proceedings. To date, there
is evidence of the prosecution and conviction of offenders in only two serious incidents. The first case involved the burglary of three migrant-owned
businesses in Buhlebesizwe No. 2 village near Kwaggafontein in 2011 for
which five citizens were sentenced to individual terms of 15 years by a Mpumalanga judge.98 In the second case, one of the three accused in the murder
of an Ethiopian trader, Thomas Ebamo, in 2012 was sentenced to 25 years’
imprisonment in what was characterized by the presiding judge as a “savage
act of xenophobia”.99 A seller of pots and carpets from his car, Ebamo had
been robbed and dragged to his death after being tied to a vehicle’s rear
by his neck. However, these convictions and judgments are very much the
exception and not the norm.

ConClusion

S

ome migrant entrepreneurs may enjoy material advantages over ordinary
South Africans in settlements where they operate their informal businesses, trading stalls or spaza shops. However, their status as “foreigners”
and “outsiders” in South African society makes them markedly vulnerable
to constant victimization, harassment and violence. More than that, these
commonplace actions magnify the sense of constant insecurity experienced
by migrants and refugees, compromising the ability of victims to fully integrate into South African society. The pervasive sense of fear and insecurity
29

Migrant EntrEprEnEurship, CollECtivE violEnCE and XEnophobia in south afriCa

and the constant possibility of violence directed at their bodies and properties is a reality that they have to face on a daily basis in areas where they
operate their businesses. As one Somali refugee put it, “we came to this
country as refugees, because Somalia is being torn apart by war, but here
another war is taking place, one that we don’t understand, but we are the
targets”.100
The terms of the debate on the rise of migrant entrepreneurship in
South Africa have been limited and selective, reiterating (both implicitly
and explicitly) the prejudiced, xenophobic idea that non-citizens are not
entitled to police protection nor even running a small business, even if it
is enshrined in law and generated through their own initiative and inventiveness.101 Explaining collective violence through an undue emphasis on
group rivalries for limited material resources allows the culpability to be
shifted on to the attacked group, migrants and refugees in this case, thus
making the victims responsible for their own suffering. Collective violence
against migrant businesses and migrants at large becomes an inexorable,
uncontrolled feature of social reality in such a delimited stance, erasing and
minimizing options for positive change or progressive interventions leading
to the fuller acceptance of immigrants into South African society, economy
and polity.102
Equally importantly, when assessments of “economic competition” are
delimited on a group basis, particularly when the boundaries are drawn
around nationality, citizenship and other forms of ethnicity, then they are
rooted in discriminatory normative judgements about the different and unequal economic entitlements of citizens and foreigners in South Africa. The
idea of economic competition itself is defined selectively and incompletely
here, omitting the very real and stronger challenges to informal entrepreneurship posed by large grocery stores or supermarkets.103 It is difficult to
imagine a scenario where the South African government would endorse or
impose severe limits on the expansion of large commercial/retail stores in
townships and poorer settlements on the grounds that they truncate business opportunities for small-scale South African entrepreneurs. In terms of
concrete, practical intervention, the focus turns in a reactionary manner
to curtailing migrant entrepreneurship in place of the real, urgent need to
support and enhance opportunities for all small entrepreneurs in marginal
settlements through new incentives and programmes.
The official idea that collective violence against migrant-owned shops
and businesses is best controlled through the imposition of tougher restrictions on migrant businesses rather than robust sanctions against perpetrators through hate-crime legislation and other measures is deeply ingrained.
So, too, is the feeling that there is no need to ease suspicions about “foreigners” and their economic activities within the country. A recent ANC
policy discussion document, for example, incongruously focused on “peace
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and stability” and recommended that “by-laws need to be strengthened” in
a manner that meant “non-South Africans should not be allowed to run or
buy spaza shops or larger businesses”.104 The document further suggested
that asylum-seekers whose refugee applications had not been finalized
by the Department of Home Affairs should be ineligible to operate and
manage such shops, diverging from protections granted to this vulnerable
group under national and international law. ANC Western Cape Secretary
Songezo Mjongile endorsed these proposals by contending that the rise of
migrant entrepreneurship was the underlying cause of friction and collective
violence in townships and saying it was “unnatural that nearly all shops in
townships are owned by foreigners. More locals need to participate and need
to be supported…it creates tension”.105
Despite providing goods at cheaper prices to poor consumers, in affordable quantities and sometimes on credit, the success and resourcefulness
of migrant entrepreneurs is regularly and often falsely attributed to the use
of illegitimate practices such as the sale of expired goods and failure to pay
taxes. Police Commissioner Arno Lamoer admitted to Parliament’s Police
Portfolio Committee that migrant and refugee entrepreneurs constituted
the victims in two-thirds of crimes such as robberies committed against
small businesses in the Western Cape, but held them responsible for operating shops from homes or containers without trading permits, failing to bank
their earnings and sleeping in the store premises.106 Similarly, DTI Minister
Davies’ defence of the Licensing of Businesses Bill argued that its basic purpose was to control illegal imports and trading when most commentators
have seen it as a frontal attack on migrant entrepreneurship since, amongst
other things, it requires all migrants to have business permits that cost far
more than what all but a tiny minority of informal entrepreneurs can afford.
Far from reducing xenophobia in South Africa, claims that collective
violence against migrant businesses are simply acts of criminality legitimize and may even incite further violence. These acts are both criminal
and opportunistic, but not in the sense suggested in public and political
discourses in South Africa. These acts are criminal in that they can be considered as offences under the South African penal code and undermine the
rule of law. Using this logic, one may argue that those who have engaged
in such acts may be considered as “criminals”. South African shop owners
have certainly engaged long-term, hardened offenders to get rid of their
“competition” through violence, and it may even be argued that “criminals”
have committed some of these acts.107 But a strong case can be made that
not all of those who have engaged in such violence have histories of criminal
activity. Situations of mayhem and melee may allow some ordinary citizens
to engage in such actions and the material benefits from participating in
such violent actions through looting cannot be detached from the analysis.
Therefore, an element of opportunism is clearly present, which is why some
observers have called it “opportunistic xenophobia”.108
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Selective notions about the barriers faced by South African small-scale
entrepreneurs animate this debate, as do biased ideas about migrants, their
activities, and false reasons for their success. The deeply-embedded terrain
of xenophobia further provides the fertile, volatile context in which a range
of social, political and economic actors (including participants in violent
attacks, South African traders, local councillors and, in some cases, police)
have controlled the anxieties associated with the presence of migrants for
their own narrow, self-serving interests. The escalating pattern of collective
violence against migrants and their businesses signals the deeply-drawn
divisions between insiders and outsiders, based on birth, citizenship and
nationality. This highly repetitive cycle of violence targeting migrant entrepreneurs underscores the precarious status they and other immigrants hold
in South African society.
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